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Emic and etic
TILL MOSTOWLANSKY, ANDREA ROTA The Graduate Institute Geneva & University of Bern
The emic/etic distinction originated in linguistics in the 1950s to designate two complementary standpoints for the analysis of
human language and behaviour. It has been subject to debates in the humanities and social sciences ever since. Imported into
anthropology in the 1960s, etic came to stand for ambitions to establish an objective, scientific approach to the study of culture,
whereas emic refers to the goal of grasping the world according to one’s interlocutors’ particular points of view. While the
distinction lost traction as an analytical instrument in anthropology in the 1990s, emic and etic have become concepts used by
various other disciplines and subfields in the humanities and social sciences. In these contexts, they continue to be used to
address a range of different epistemological and methodological issues, such as the relationship between researcher and
research subject or the question of how to legitimately interpret social practices. For this reason, the emic/etic distinction
remains relevant. It draws attention to fundamental differences in the way scholars and students of various disciplines approach
and discuss research, data, and comparison.
Introduction 
To most students and scholars in the humanities and social sciences, the term emic is probably familiar
from introductory  courses  and  casual  references  to  the  concepts,  statements,  and  interactions  of  a
researcher’s  interlocutors  in  ethnographic  research.  While  emic  has  remained  in  use  as  part  of
anthropological  jargon,  its  conceptual  counterpart,  etic,  a  term often  loosely  employed to  identify  a
researcher’s own analytic framework, has fallen out of fashion. As a result, the historical development of
these counterparts has likewise faded into obscurity. However, twentieth-century thinking on emic/etic
encapsulates  and  sheds  light  on  central  debates  in  the  humanities  and  social  sciences  that  retain
importance today. The terms are neologisms of the 1950s that were introduced to anthropology from
linguistics. They have come to stand for major differences in epistemology, methodology, and theory, for
example with regard to materialism, religion, theories of the mind, and relativistic versus comparative
approaches to studying social life.
To understand the contemporary  significance of  emic/etic  for  the  study of  culture  and society,  it  is
paramount to discuss the distinction’s history in anthropology – especially in the period from the 1960s to
the early 1990s – as well as its afterlives in various fields in the humanities and social sciences in which the
terms are still widely used. This entry’s first section, therefore, analyses the emergence of emic/etic in the
process of  interactions between linguists  and anthropologists  in the 1950s and 1960s.  It  follows the
trajectories of the main protagonists in this process, linguist Kenneth L. Pike and anthropologist Marvin
Till Mostowlansky, Andrea Rota. Emic and etic. CEA   2
This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
For image use please see separate credit(s). ISSN 2398-516X
Harris. The second section turns to the actual contents of the emic/etic debate of the late 1980s, which
reflect  major epistemological  differences in the social  sciences of  the time. Finally,  the third section
addresses current scholarship in the humanities and social sciences that continues to debate the emic/etic
distinction.  
Beginnings
Categories and approaches addressing issues similar to the emic/etic distinction have notable precedents in
linguistics and anthropology (e.g. Swadesh 1934; Sapir 1949 [1927]; Malinowski 1944, 1954). However, the
introduction and formalization of  the concepts  emic/etic  should be credited to  the American linguist
Kenneth L. Pike. Pike’s work was informed by both his academic research at the University of Michigan and
his  missionary  involvement  in  the  Summer  Institute  of  Linguistics,  a  Christian-based  organization
specialising in translating the Bible into lesser-known languages (Pike 1962). As a specialist of non-Indo-
European languages such as the Mixtec language family, Pike’s early career focused on the study of
phonetics and phonemics both as objects of theoretical inquiry and as a pragmatic means to research and
codify local languages (Pike 1943, 1947).
In linguistics, phonetics is the study of the sounds of human speech and their production. One of the aims
of  phonetics  research  is  to  develop  a  cross-linguistic  representation  of  all  sounds  found  in  human
languages. For instance, the French word cher (‘dear’ or ‘expensive’) and the English word sheep begin
with  the  same phone,  [  ʃ  ]–  a  voiceless  palato–alveolar  fricative  –  according to  the  notation of  the
International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA). Yet not all phonetic differences are relevant to speakers of any given
language in their communication. Drawing on this observation, phonemics aims to reconstruct the implicit
or unconscious system of sound contrasts that are employed to distinguish meaningful utterances in a
given language. For instance, /r/ and /l/ are distinct phonemes in English; thus, rip and lip have different
meanings. Conversely, the /r/ in the word great will sound quite different when pronounced by a Scotsman
or a Londoner, but the meaning of the word will remain the same, which indicates that English speakers
perceive the two phonetically distinct sounds as nonetheless the same phoneme.
In the 1950s, Pike became increasingly critical of approaches that considered language a form of human
activity essentially distinct from non-linguistic behaviour,  and he sought to develop a theoretical  and
methodological approach that treated ‘[v]erbal and nonverbal activity as a unified whole' (Pike 1954: 2). An
initial step towards this goal was to extend the distinction between phonetics and phonemics to the analysis
of all forms of human behaviour. Eliminating the reference to sound units implied by the prefix ‘phon-’ gave
rise to the terms emic and etic. Pike defined emic and etic as ‘two basic standpoints from which a human
observer can describe human behavior, each of them valuable for certain specific purposes' (Pike 1954: 8).
According to Pike, an etic  approach would rely on a generalised classification system devised by the
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researcher in advance for the study of any particular culture in order to compare and classify behavioural
data from across the world, analogous to the use of the International Phonetic Alphabet to compare the
sounds  of  spoken  language.  For  instance,  a  researcher  might  outline  a  series  of  formal  criteria  to
distinguish among different types of speech acts, such as statements, orders, and promises. Such an etic
taxonomy could then be employed to compare the use of these distinct functions of language in different
settings (see Reiss 1985).
Conversely,  following  Pike,  an  emic  approach  would  dispense  with  a  priori  means  of  classification.
Focusing on one culture at a time, its goal would be to discover and describe the structured patterns of
mental and bodily activities that the members of that culture, consciously or unconsciously, regard as
distinct and significant for their system of behaviour. Thus, an emic approach would call attention to the
fact that two etically idential behaviours can in fact differ profoundly, depending on the meaning and
purpose of the actors. To illustrate this, Pike employed the example of two identical statements on the
Parliament floor, one of which could serve to promote a piece of legislation, the other to filibuster it,
depending on the intentions of the speaker (1954: 13). Another example is the killing of a fly, which may be
a trivial gesture in one place, but may have deeper moral implications in others. Pike thus emphasised that
emic and etic standpoints should be regarded as two elements of a stereoscopic image – one that combines
two points of view on the same data to represent its object (Kassam & Bashuna 2004: 209-12; Pike 1954:
12). Yet, for Pike, the emic standpoint provided deeper insight into a particular culture because it helps
scholars understand the attitudes, motives, and interests of social actors within the context of their cultural
wholes.
Pike’s discussion of the emic/etic distinction was just the starting point for the development of tagmemics,
a complex system of grammatical analysis devoted to the study of the basic units of language (Pike 1982;
Hahn 2005). Within the social sciences, however, the transmission of Pike’s ideas was largely limited to the
core terms emic/etic, which found their way into anthropology at least a decade after Pike had coined them
(Headland 1990: 15) and became increasingly popular in anthropological publications from the 1960s to
the 1980s (e.g. Berger et al. 1976; Durbin 1972; Levi-Strauss 1972; Feleppa 1986). During this period, the
lines of transmission led in two directions: a transmission of the concepts emic/etic from linguistics (in the
spirit of Kenneth Pike) directly into anthropological studies (e.g. Dundes 1962); and a different trajectory
for the terms, which were popularised through the continuously-evolving work of Marvin Harris.
In 1964, Harris, then at Columbia University, published his first major work, The nature of cultural things,
in which he refers to Pike and the emic/etic distinction. This book served as an early entry point for the
concepts into anthropology. In 1968, Harris published The rise of anthropological theory, which remains
one of the most cited histories of the development of anthropological thought. Harris’s history, covering a
plethora  of  anthropological  debates  from nineteenth-century  evolutionism to  French  structuralism to
British social anthropology, ends in the 1960s with a theory – cultural materialism – which he himself
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coined and which he propagated as a means to return to anthropology’s ‘scientific’ aspirations. Cultural
materialism is based on the assumption that ‘human social life is a response to the practical problems of
earthly existence’ (Harris 1979: ix), and, drawing on Marxian, evolutionary, and ecological ideas, sought to
uncover  the  material  –  that  is,  economic,  biological,  environmental  –  determinants  of  sociocultural
phenomena. Harris thereby argued for a focus on the ‘objective’ causes of human behaviour and defended
a view of anthropology as a universal science of society devoted to the formulation of general, explanatory,
and testable theories (Harris 1979; 1994).
In the proclamation of cultural materialism, Harris tried to build a case against the New Ethnography and
ethnoscience movements  (Sturtevant  1964)  of  the same period,  which propagated the emic  study of
cognition and language to examine how different cultures perceive and interact with their environments.
Harris particularly criticised the unreflective borrowing of concepts from linguistics, including Pike’s emic
and etic. In this process, he also introduced his own, critical reinterpretation of emic/etic as part of the
epistemological framework of cultural materialism.
In The rise of anthropological theory, the emic/etic distinction served to differentiate between what Harris
called ‘cultural idealism’ and ‘cultural materialism’ in ‘an age dedicated to eclectic middle-ground theories’
(1968: 569). With the term ‘cultural idealism’, Harris (1968: 568) was hinting at a broad spectrum of
misguided anthropological approaches – ‘accumulated liabilities of the past two hundred years’ – that aim
to explore informants’ mental states and motivations. According to Harris (1968: 576), this emic strand of
theory, including the work of his contemporary, Claude Lévi-Strauss, failed to recognise the methodological
dilemma that  derives  from the  fact  that  ‘the  ethnographer  teaches  the  informant  how to  teach the
ethnographer to think in appropriate emic terms’. In contrast, Harris fervently promoted an etic approach
as the foundation of cultural materialism and a way out of anthropology’s increasing scientific irrelevance.
By etic, Harris meant statements and categories that receive confirmation from other scientists, but not
necessarily from informants. Etics thus allowed anthropologists to develop their arguments on the basis of
scientific frameworks that are rooted in assumedly objective social processes and relations. This would
eventually render anthropology ‘the science of culture’.
Harris’s research programme – further clarified in his widely referenced 1979 book Cultural materialism:
the struggle for a science of culture – built on Marx and a range of other positivistic thinkers to emphasise
societal infrastructure, structure, and superstructure as determinants of culture (Kuznar & Sanderson
2007: 4). In Cultural materialism, as well as in much later work leading up to Harris’s final monograph,
Theories of culture in postmodern times (1999), the distinction between emic and etic served to shed light
on the difference between social scientists who analyse their informants’ interpretations of events (emic)
and those who weigh such interpretations against the forces of economy, ecology, and technology (etic).
Harris discussed this distinction using, for instance, his research on ‘bovicide’ in southern India (1979: 32).
This research juxtaposed farmers’ statements that all calves – male and female – were treated and fed
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equally with statistical data that showed that male calves were significantly more likely to die. In a context
in which the Hindu prohibition against bovine slaughter was dominant but in which there was no use for
male traction animals, Harris argued that the starving and neglect of male calves was emically rationalised
as ‘males being weaker’. However, from an etic perspective, local economic and ecological conditions led
farmers to actively cull male calves by pulling them from their mothers’ teats.
The emic/etic debate
From the  1960s  to  the  1980s,  many  anthropologists  took  up  emic/etic,  either  as  a  way  to  position
themselves epistemologically or simply to indicate alignment with a major strand of anthropological theory.
However, no scholar employed the terms as pointedly and deliberately as Marvin Harris did to promote his
own theory – cultural materialism – over such a long period of time. We can thus look at Harris as a node in
anthropological discussions on the emic/etic  distinction. Such discussions first took place in academic
journals (e.g. Harris 1976) and then in person in 1988 when Pike and Harris were part of an invited panel
at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association in Phoenix, Arizona. In front of an
audience of an estimated six hundred anthropologists, the two protagonists of the decades-long intellectual
debate encountered each other.
In his introduction to the collected papers presented at the symposium, Thomas Headland (1990), who was
responsible for organising the event, called attention to the rising popularity of emic/etic beyond the field
of anthropology. During the 1970s, the terms had not only spread to other social sciences, but had also
found their way into English dictionaries. Yet, unsurprisingly, the dissemination of the concepts in various
fields had led to growing confusion regarding their scholarly definitions. Depending on the academic
context,  the  emic/etic  distinction  was  used  synonymously  with  verbal/nonverbal,  specific/universal,
description/theory, and in many other ways. Although Headland considered most of these imaginative
interpretations to  be inaccurate,  he acknowledged that  they had been heuristically  useful  in  various
disciplines and that the extension of the original meaning was therefore legitimate. He also argued that
such latitude could prove detrimental to the field of anthropology. A conceptual clarification therefore
seemed in order. This, however, proved to be a complex task. As various examples illustrate, what emerged
from the debate was less a coherent view of the emic/etic distinction than an interconnected inventory of
contested epistemological issues.
Pike and Harris accepted that their uses and understandings of emic/etic diverged from one another. More
importantly,  however, they used emic/etic  in the service of distinct scientific paradigms. Defending a
Kantian perspective, Pike portrayed thinking, imagining, and speaking as ways of relating the individual to
the world that are inevitably mediated by the ‘emic structures’  of  a culture (Pike 1990a: 34).  As he
suggested in one example, it is only by availing themselves of those cultural categories that the members of
a family can say that they are not merely eating together in the morning, but are having breakfast (Pike
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1990a: 39-40).
In his opinion, the main task of the researcher was to reconstruct the unexpressed ‘emic knowledge’ that
guides human behaviour. Etic concepts were to provide a helpful steppingstone towards this goal – just as a
phonetic analysis provided an entry point to decoding an unknown language (Pike 1990b: 64-5; Pike 1954:
11). Harris, on the other hand, championed a neo-behaviourist perspective and vehemently opposed the
anthropological ‘dogma’ that identified the ‘distinctively human capacity for expectations, intentions, and
ideas’ as the key to explaining human behaviour (Harris 1990a: 55). According to his approach, an analysis
employing etic categories was not only a goal in itself, but was in fact essential if one is to account for
emergent social phenomena that were not consciously or individually intended.
Pushing this argument further, Harris objected to Pike’s view that thinking, imagining, and speaking are
kinds of ‘emic behavior’ (Harris 1990b: 78), insisting that the terms emic and etic were not meant to
demarcate particular types of behaviour (for instance, mental events versus bodily movements). Rather,
they referred to separate modes of description the researched used – Pike had actually emphasised himself
in his early works. In Harris’s opinion, the advantage of emic/etic over similar binary modes of description
such as subjective/objective or insider/outsider derives precisely from its inherent epistemological focus.
For instance, participants and observers can both be subjective and objective in their descriptions and
analyses. However, ‘the discrimination between emic and etic modes depends strictly on the operations
employed by the observers’ (Harris 1990a: 50). In this epistemological understanding of the terms, Harris
underscored that the validity of scientific results ultimately depends on the consensus of the community of
observers, independent of the distinctions that the actors themselves consider appropriate (Harris 1990b:
78). Etic categories are regarded as scientifically sound when they allow for the discovery of objective
social patterns and the production of general and verifiable knowledge, and not because they apprehend
some subjective account of the world. As Harris put it, etic analyses ‘stand or fall on their contribution to
predictive  or  retrodictive  nomothetic  theories  about  the  evolution  of  sociocultural  differences  and
similarities’ (Harris 1990: 53-4).
This argument revealed an even more profound fault line. For Pike, scholars themselves were ‘creatures of
their scientifically and naturally categorized linguistic environment’ who may not recognize the ‘local’ or
culture-specific nature of their own point of view (1990b: 68). This implied that the etic categories devised
by the scholars had no special status, but amounted to nothing more than the emic  perspective of a
scientific community (Pike 1954: 9). This idea questioned the very possibility of a cross-cultural ‘scientific’
anthropology as postulated by Harris. Harris thus warned that if all scientific concepts were regarded as
plain emic constructs, ‘the very notion of etics would have to be abandoned along with all hope of achieving
a science of human social life’ (Harris 1990b: 79). Harris insisted that the emics of the scientific community
were of  a special  kind because of  their  unique responsiveness ‘to the task of  building a diachronic,
synchronic, comparative, and global science of society and culture’ (1990a: 49). It is this fundamental
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distinction that, in Harris’s opinion, granted scientific statements the separate category of etics.
Despite  the  fact  that  the  Pike‒Harris  debate  happened in  the  context  of  a  large-scale  gathering  of
anthropologists,  it  appeared to be the end rather than the beginning of  a focused engagement with
emic/etic in anthropology. The reasons for this are complex and vary according to local contexts (and this
entry can only cover anthropological  research published in English as the main site of  the emic/etic
debate). For instance, Harris, who continued to be the main promoter of emic/etic in anthropology in the
context of cultural materialism, remained outside the period’s dominant debates, and his contemporary
work was – if acknowledged at all – referenced to distinguish critical approaches from old-fashioned ones,
with his being considered old-fashioned and not sufficiently reflexive (e.g. Marcus & Fischer 1999 [1986]:
111).
Furthermore, the significant influence of postcolonial studies and poststructuralism on anthropology in the
1980s and 1990s contributed to a turn away from aspirations to conduct cross-cultural analysis and achieve
scientific objectivity – or etics – that had been an integral part of cultural materialism. At the same time,
the temporary decline in interest in Marxian historical materialism that came with the end of the Cold War
assured that cultural materialism ‒ and thereby Harris’s take on emic/etic ‒ were laid to rest. In his late
work, and most explicitly in the essay ‘Cultural materialism is alive and well and won’t go away until
something better comes along’, Harris sought to defend his positivistic stance against the constructivist
position of feminist theory and the deconstructive approaches of Derrida and Foucault (1994: 74). In
Harris’s opinion, the relativism inherent in these paradigms led down a dangerous path towards the
rejection of scientific truth and, ultimately, to fascism.
It  is  against  this  backdrop that  we can understand the receding interest  in  emic/etic  as  a  heuristic
instrument in anthropology. While discussions around emic/etic occasionally resurface (e.g. Ginzburg 2017;
Sahlins 2017), they often do so in the form of footnotes and do not seem to affect larger theoretical
debates. Although anthropologists continue to employ the term emic to broadly refer to an interlocutor’s
standpoint as well as collective ‘local’ practices and perspectives (e.g. Beyer 2016: xix; Her 2018; Knauft
2019),  it  has lost  its  analytical  significance.  Similarly,  the epistemological  and theoretical  arguments
related to the term etic have lost traction or appear using other terms, for instance in relation to universal
cognitive constraints as foundations for cross-cultural comparison (e.g. Whitehouse 2004) or in debates
concerning cultural and ontological difference (Heywood 2017). Meanwhile, emic/etic have emerged in
other fields of the humanities and social sciences. The following section discusses selected examples, some
of which have fed back into on-going anthropological debates.
Afterlives: language, infrastructure, and religion
In  linguistics,  Pike’s  legacy lives  on through the numerous scholars  he trained to  analyse unwritten
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languages, in particular in his capacity as director of the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) (Wise,
Headland  & Brend  2001).  His  original  approach  to  the  study  of  language  and  behaviour,  however,
succumbed to the paradigm shift within linguistics towards Noam Chomsky’s theory of transformational
grammar (Headland 2001). Yet,  one of Pike’s students, the anthropologist and former SIL missionary
Daniel Everett, has recently revived the conceptual reflection on the emics of culture at the intersection of
linguistics and anthropology.
Everett’s discussion of the implications of an emic perspective is set against the backdrop of a widely
publicised scientific  dispute  between him and Chomsky (Everett  2005;  Colapinto  2007;  Wolfe  2016).
Drawing on his analysis of the language spoken by the Pirahã people of Amazonia, Everett questions
Chomsky’s thesis of a universal grammar shared by all of humankind and insists on the role of culture in
shaping underlying linguistic structures. Developing this argument further, Everett (2007, 2016) criticises
the nativist tradition in Western philosophy that, from Plato to Chomsky, postulates a psychic unity of
mankind on the grounds of shared innate concepts. In contrast, Everett situates his work in a lineage that
extends from Aristotle to Michael Polanyi and emphasises personal experiences and appreciations as the
sources of tacit forms of knowledge. Within this framework, Everett deploys the concept of emicization
(citing Pike 1967) to characterise the individual internalization of a number of ineffable or unspoken
background premises and know-how that constitute a culturally specific ‘insider point of view’ and ground
our understanding of the ‘self’ (Everett 2016: 18).
Everett does not conceive of culture as a concrete, static entity that individuals appropriate, but rather as
an ‘abstract network shaping and connecting social roles, hierarchically structured knowledge domains,
and ranked values’ (2016: 79). For Everett, culture resides exclusively in the minds of individuals. Thus, the
unity of a culture and the power of culture to influence thoughts and behaviours are not determined at a
social  level,  but rather emerge from the overlapping backgrounds of  individuals who share similar –
although never identical – experiences in a local context. For Everett, emicization is the process that leads,
consciously  or  unconsciously,  from  objective  experience  to  the  formation  of  a  common  subjective
appreciation of the world (2016: 116). Therefore, in his opinion, emicization constitutes the answer to one
of the fundamental anthropological questions: ‘How is culture even possible?’ (Everett 2016: 116).
As noted earlier,  the rise of new trends in anthropology at the end of the twentieth century largely
prevented the transmission of Harris’s theoretical reflections on the emic/etic distinction to a broader
audience of scholars. More recent anthropological studies on infrastructure (e.g. Appel, Anand & Gupta
2018; Dalakoglou 2017) have once again critically engaged with the legacy of cultural materialism and the
claims it  developed with respect to the determining force of infrastructure vis-à-vis sociocultural and
political processes. For instance, in his study of a highway from Albania to Greece, Dimitris Dalakoglou
(2017) observes that early anthropological approaches to infrastructure, such as Harris’s (1968), hindered
broader ethnographic exploration through their static, deterministic frameworks. Dalakoglou argues that
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Harris’s cultural materialism lacked ‘the necessary departure from the Marxist grand narrative toward
ethnographic particularity and then back to theory […] in concrete and organized ways’ (2017:11). From a
Marxian, positivistic perspective, which Harris largely followed, ‘ontological diversity among the various
dimensions  of  an  infrastructure  (e.g.  the  sociocultural,  material,  historical)’  is  replaced  by  a  broad,
overarching  category  of  infrastructure  that  determines  everything  else.  An  etic  analysis  of  the  sort
championed by Harris was, therefore, expected to focus on universal infrastructural processes underlying
specific cultures.
It  is  precisely  this  much-criticised  aspect  of  cultural  materialism  that  has  led  anthropologists  of
infrastructure, and contemporary scholars of materiality more generally (Coole & Frost 2010; Ellenzweig &
Zammito 2017), to turn to Science and Technology Studies (STS) and their take on infrastructure as a
product of human/non-human interaction. In the kind of materialism proposed early on by scholars of STS
such as Bruno Latour (1987, 2005) and Langdon Winner (1989), infrastructures are not a universal or
otherwise objective category. Rather, they are part and parcel of sociocultural practices and therefore
shaped by class,  race,  and relations of  power at  different scales –  as demonstrated,  for instance,  in
Stephanie Tam’s (2013) study of caste relations and regimes of purity in Ahmedabad’s sewage system since
the time of its construction in colonial India. In this framework, the idea of infrastructure is fundamentally
opposed  to  pre-conceived  dichotomies,  including  epistemological  distinctions  between  mobile/static,
subject/object, and emic/etic.
As  these  examples  indicate,  in  its  more  recent  uses  the  emic/etic  distinction  tends  to  accompany
disciplinary debates in various (sub-)disciplines. The study of religion offers a last telling example. The
importation of emic/etic and similar distinctions into the study of religion has been largely mediated
through the work of Clifford Geertz (e.g. 1966, 1974; see A. Geertz 1997). Since the 1960s, Geertz’s work
on  religion  has  provided  essential  resources  to  move  this  discipline  away  from  its  original
phenomenological concerns with the nature and manifestations of a distinct sacred reality to framing
religion as a social and cultural domain of human thought and activity (Wiebe 1984; Gladigow 2005).
During this long – and to some extent still on-going – process, the emic/etic distinction became intertwined
with  contentious  methodological  and  epistemological  issues  concerning  the  alleged  special  status  of
religious ‘insiders’, as opposed to academic ‘outsiders’. At the heart of the controversy lay the question of
whether or not religious ‘insiders’ have privileged access to and understanding of religious matters.
From a methodological point of view, the debate has raised the question of how scholars determine who
counts as a religious insider and whether it is possible or necessary for outsiders to acquire such a status if
they  are  to  credibly  analyse  religious  phenomena.  Recent  scholarship  questions  the  validity  of  the
insider/outsider dichotomy as a way to assess the status of  an individual  with respect to a religious
tradition or community. In this regard, George Chryssides and Stephen Gregg (2019: vii) point out that
‘[t]here are not merely insiders and outsiders, but a whole range of positions that those who belong or do
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not belong to religious communities find themselves in’. Accordingly, they underscore the importance of
‘acknowledging different modes of accepting and rejecting various forms of religious life’.
From an epistemological point of view, the insider/outsider debate in the study of religion highlights
significant differences between scholars. On the one hand, there are those who frame religion as a sui
generis phenomenon; that is, as a separate reality the appreciation of which would necessitate a form of
‘religious insight’ that only ‘insiders’ could possibly bring to bear. On the other hand, there are scholars
who defend the possibility of studying religion by means of sociological, anthropological, and psychological
approaches (Mostowlansky & Rota 2016). In this context, various authors have criticised the idea that
religion necessitates a special mode of knowing as a normative stance and as a political move in a struggle
for (academic) influence (Wiebe 1999; McCutcheon 1997; Jensen 2011).
Russell McCutcheon’s (1999) volume The insider/outsider problem in the study of religion constitutes an
important node in this debate, but also contributed to the conflation of emic with ‘insider’ and etic with
‘outsider’. One way to disentangle these dimensions at the epistemic level is to employ Niklas Luhmann’s
(2000) distinction between first- and second-order observers (Mostowlansky & Rota 2016). According to
this distinction, first-order observers appreciate the world according to a specific perspective. However,
they are not reflexively aware of the fact that their point of view is contextually situated. Religious insiders
can be equated to first-order observers who relate to the world on the basis of their religious convictions –
for instance, the way they conceive of God or the sacred. Second-order observers, on the other hand,
examine how first-order observers observe; that is, they appreciate the perspectival character of first-order
observations and explore how and why first-order observers uphold a certain perspective. Academics can
also be first-order observers, just as religious practitioners can reflexively assume the position of second-
order observers. But emic and etic are not synonymous with first- and second-order observations. Rather,
emic and etic  analyses are both  the product of second-order observers, although they imply different
standpoints. In sum, as Steven Sutcliffe points out, emic and etic address ‘the question of how, rather than
by whom, the object of knowledge is constructed’ (2019: 30, emphasis in original). In the study of religion,
emic approaches are favoured by, for instance, scholars in the tradition of critical theory who focus on
empirical uses of the term ‘religion’ as an instrument to categorise and control certain aspects of the world
(Bergunder 2014). Conversely, examples of etic perspectives can be found in the burgeoning field of the
cognitive science of religion, which draws on cognitive, ecological, and evolutionary theories to explain the
universality of human beliefs and practices associated with religion (Pyysiäinen 2013).
Conclusion
The historic significance of the emic/etic distinction in anthropology is twofold. The terms emic and etic
have provided scholars with a vocabulary that directs the attention of their audience towards important
issues of analytical perspective, standpoint, and positionality without having to articulate them in detail. In
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the case of emic, many anthropologists have employed the term intuitively to point to their interlocutors’
standpoints. While the term etic has largely disappeared with the decline of Marvin Harris’s cultural
materialism,  similar  issues are raised in debates on comparative approaches.  What is  more,  debates
surrounding the emic/etic distinction themselves constitute a fruitful object of study in that they provide
important insights into the development of anthropological theory over more than six decades.
The explicit theoretical relevance of the emic/etic distinction has progressively faded in anthropology since
the 1990s. Yet in other disciplines, the terms have been used in a multiplicity of dimensions and sub-
debates.  As  a  result,  they  do  not  have  a  clear  definition  today.  Rather,  emic/etic  are  continuously
appropriated and reinterpreted in various fields of the humanities and social sciences, often to express a
range of ontological, epistemological, and methodological standpoints. These fields include – in addition to
the ones discussed above – cross-cultural psychology (e.g. Eckensberger 2015), history (e.g. Ginzburg
2013), and management studies (e.g. Buckley 2014). One way to think about the emic/etic distinction, then,
is  that  it  consists  of  two adaptable concepts  that  scholars  employ to  address issues salient  in  their
disciplines.  As  such,  they  are  part  of  on-going  struggles  between  the  quest  for  objectivity  and  the
acknowledgment of its potential elusiveness. 
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